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parking lot and followed the Blazer. (R. 669:134, 149.) Kelly testified that he was able 
to stay up with the Blazer, possibly reaching speeds of 30 to 35 miles per hour in the 
parking lot. (R. 669:136.) He could not see Stephanie while the Blazer was moving. (R. 
669:136-37, 152, 160.) When the Blazer reached the bowling alley, Kelly heard a gun 
shot and saw Stephanie drop to the ground. (R. 669:137.) Kelly stopped the car and 
called 9-1-1. Stephanie had been shot in the head. (R. 669:138.) 
Stephanie's boyfriend, John Dinga, also was in the parking lot that evening with 
Stephanie's friend, Troy Roberts.1 (R. 669:182.) Earlier in the evening, Dinga talked 
with Stephanie on the cellular phone about the planned meeting. (R. 669:181-82.) Dinga 
and Roberts decided to park in the Wal-Mart parking lot to watch the property exchange 
between Stephanie and Todd in the Hometown Buffet parking lot. Dinga and Roberts 
did not want to be seen by Todd. (R. 669:182.) 
Roberts testified for the state. He stated that when Stephanie and Todd met in the 
Wal-Mart parking lot, he could see them argue at the Blazer, and he could see Stephanie 
grab onto the Blazer as Todd drove away. (R. 669:184-86.) Roberts testified that 
Stephanie hung onto the door with her left arm inside and her right arm wrapped over it. 
(R. 669:186-88,200.) 
Roberts claimed that he and Dinga followed right behind the Blazer, while Roberts 
watched Stephanie. He estimated that the vehicles were traveling at 30 to 50 miles per 
1 Troy Roberts was a methamphetamine distributor. (R. 673:906.) On the night of the 
incident, Stephanie had intoxicating amounts of methamphetamine in her blood. (R. 
670:269.) 
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hour. (R. 669:189-90.) Roberts also claimed that just before Stephanie fell from the 
Blazer, he saw the shadow of Todd's arm through the tinted window as Todd lifted his 
arm across his body. (R. 669:191-92, 205-06.) Roberts did not see a gun. (R. 669:191.) 
A juror questioned why Roberts and Dinga did not run over Stephanie when she fell from 
the Blazer if in fact they were following closely behind the Blazer at such a rate of speed. 
(See R. 670:232.) 
Dinga testified during Todd's case in chief. He stated that he drove Troy Roberts 
to the Wal-Mark parking lot to observe Todd's meeting with Stephanie. (R. 672:659-60.) 
Dinga saw Stephanie argue with Todd outside the Blazer, and he saw Stephanie jump 
onto the driver's side door/window as Todd drove away. (R. 672:663.) After that, Dinga 
backed up and killed the engine of his car. (R. 672:663-64.) By the time Dinga and 
Roberts got going again, Dinga did not have Stephanie in view until after she fell off the 
Blazer. (R. 672:667-68.) Dinga did not see Stephanie fall; Dinga and Roberts were 
waylaid "150 to 200 feet behind" the Blazer. (R. 672:668.) 
Dinga testified that before he drove with Roberts to the Wal-Mart, he spoke with 
Todd on a cellular phone and made arrangements that same evening to meet with Todd at 
a Texaco station in Draper. (R. 672:687.) In truth, Dinga never planned to go to the 
Texaco. Instead, he waited for Todd at the Wal-Mart. (R. 672:687-88.) As stated above, 
Dinga knew that Todd would be in the general area of the Wal-Mart/Hometown Buffet 
because Dinga spoke with Stephanie about her plans. (See supra, page 7.) 
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Shayne Todd also testified at trial. He stated that on February 25, 1999, 3 nights 
before the incident, he bought a gun. He felt threatened by Dinga and wanted to protect 
himself. (See R. 673:741-42 (earlier Dinga and Roberts pulled up to Todd in a car wash 
and threatened Todd with a gun); 673:798, 814, 929, 931.) Todd made different excuses 
for his purchase to the person who sold the gun to him. (See R. 671: 481, 485; 673:800-
01 (when Todd purchased the gun he claimed he needed protection from methamphe-
tamine producers and/or because his wife "was being held by somebody").) 
Todd admitted at trial that on February 28, 1999, he took the Blazer without per-
mission from Stephanie. (R. 673:755, 818.) After he took the Blazer, he talked to 
officers from three agencies to help him in returning property to Stephanie. (R. 673: 771-
72; 672:648; 673:756.) 
Todd also testified that he spoke to Dinga that evening about the Blazer and items 
in it. Dinga said that two-five gallon drums of ephedrine in the back of the Blazer 
belonged to him. (R.673:759-60, 827.)2 Todd arranged to meet with Dinga at the Texaco 
on the evening of February 28 to return the drums. (R. 673:761-62, 829-30.) Todd went 
to the Texaco, and when Dinga did not show, he left the drums by a dumpster there. (R. 
673:764-65,831-32.) 
Todd testified that he took a gun, two clips and a box of bullets with him to the 
Texaco that night. (R. 673:767.) He was scared of Dinga and Roberts. (R. 673:768.) 
2 A witness for the defense, Shannon Taylor, testified that she went to Troy Roberts's 
house after the incident to buy methamphetamine. Roberts told her that his girlfriend had 
been shot. He also said he was not able to get the ephedrine from the truck. (R. 673:908.) 
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Todd next went to the Hometown Buffet and parked across the street so he could 
assess the situation. (R. 673:769.) When a car approached him, Todd did not know who 
it was. (R. 673:772-73, 839-40.) He thought perhaps it was Dinga and Roberts. (R. 673: 
840.) He placed the loaded gun in his lap. (R. 673:840.) He then saw that it was Kelly 
and Stephanie. (R. 673:773.) Todd handed Stephanie's purse to Kelly as Stephanie 
walked to the Blazer and began to argue with Todd. (R. 673:841, 846.) Stephanie told 
Todd that "her people were there" and she needed the truck. (R. 673:774, 856, 859.) 
Stephanie then jumped onto the truck and tried to grab the keys. Todd pushed her 
off and began to drive away. (R. 673:775, 848-49.) Stephanie jumped onto the driver's 
door again while Todd drove away. (R. 673:775.) Stephanie held onto the steering 
column with her left hand, and she held onto Todd with her right hand. (R. 673:777, 
849.) Todd told Stephanie he had a gun and she reached down with her right hand and 
grabbed it. (R. 673:777-78, 859.) Todd tried to take it from her when it went off. (R. 
673:779-80,875.) 
Stephanie fell from the truck. (R. 673:780.) Todd could see several cars chasing 
after him, so he drove away. He was scared and panicked. (R. 673:780, 861.) 
Todd ultimately pulled over on a street and made several telephone calls. (R. 
673:781, 783.) He called Stephanie's cellular phone and spoke with Dinga and an officer. 
(R. 672:699; 673:783-85.) He called Stephanie's father (R. 671:548; 673:787, 880-81); 
he called his mother (R. 673:788, 883-84); and he called Stephanie's best friend. (R. 
671:591; 673:786-87, 881.) Todd was distraught and concerned. He did not recall the 
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specific order of the telephone calls. (R. 673:889.) 
Officers arrested Todd at his brother-in-law's house in Sunset, Utah, on March 1, 
1999. He was cooperative and emotional. (R. 671:559, 563-64.) He spoke to police 
about the incident. (R. 673:790, 892-93, 895, 897-99.) 
The parties also presented evidence from experts and investigating officers. 
— The state medical examiner, Todd Grey, testified to the cause of death. 
Stephanie Todd died from a bullet wound to the head. (See R. 670:247-48, 275.) The 
bullet entered on the left side, and exited on the right. (Id.) The bullet ultimately went 
through a window at the bowling alley and lodged in a wall. (R. 670:306-07, 313.) The 
medical examiner testified that given the composition and path of the wound, the barrel of 
the gun may have been pressed against Stephanie's head. (R. 670:245-46, 260; 671:450.) 
Stephanie also had bruises on her neck, arm and hand, and abrasions on her cheek, 
shoulder, thumb and hand. Stephanie likely suffered the bruises and abrasions when she 
fell from the truck; they did not contribute to her cause of death. (See 670:241-42, 277.) 
The medical examiner could not specifically explain a scrape or tear that appeared on 
Stephanie's right hand. (See R. 670:251-54, 265-69, 272.) 
— A state expert testified that he estimated the speed of the Blazer in the parking 
lot to be 15.56 to 18.67 miles per hour. (R. 671:436.) The expert also testified that if the 
Blazer had been parked in a particular spot in front of the bowling alley, it would be 
possible to see shadows inside the Blazer. (R. 671:526-28.) Significantly, the Blazer was 
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not at a stand still at the spot in question during the night of the incident. (See R. 671:552 
(the officers were only able to estimate the Blazer's placement).) The Blazer would have 
passed through the spot in front of the bowling alley in a split second. (See R. 671:535.) 
~ Investigators found that the dust on top of and closest to the passenger side of 
the steering column was disturbed, supporting Todd's testimony that Stephanie held onto 
the steering column. (R. 670:323; 673:776-77, 849.) 
— Officers testified that lock and window mechanisms in the Blazer were automa-
tic and in the door panel. (R.670:318-19.) Consequently, the scrape or tear on Stephanie's 
right hand apparently was not caused by anything on the Blazer. (See i.e. R. 670:254.) 
— An emergency physician testified that the tear to Stephanie's right hand was 
consistent with an injury occurring if Stephanie had a hold of the gun barrel when the 
gun discharged. (R. 674:949-952, 954-55.) The quick and forceful slide of the barrel 
during the blast would cause the sort of pinching or tearing that appeared on Stephanie's 
right hand. (R. 674:959; see also 674:1036.) That evidence supported that Stephanie 
was holding onto the gun when it fired. (See e.g. 673:777-780.) 
- A detective collected "gunshot residue" samples from Stephanie's hands during 
the autopsy. (R. 671:518.) The crime lab determined that the amounts collected were 
insufficient for testing. (R. 671:554-56.) Also, officers discovered a palm print on the 
ejection port of the gun barrel. (R. 674:1036-37.) 
- An officer at the jail, Raelene Eppard, testified that she overheard Todd say to 
another inmate, "The bitch deserved what she got." (R. 671:574.) Eppard claimed she 
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reported the statement to her sergeant. (R. 671:582.) The sergeant denied that Eppard 
made any such report. (R. 673:934-35.) Eppard's testimony was further discredited by 
her personnel file, which showed that she had been disciplined for lying to an officer. (R. 
674:1112.) 
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court instructed the jury on several variations of 
homicide including murder, reckless manslaughter and negligent homicide. (R. 481-83; 
488-91.) The jury found Todd guilty of murder. (R. 677.) Additional facts relating to the 
issue on appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
During closing argument in this case, the prosecutor made improper, prejudicial 
statements. She urged the jury to consider what the victim would have said at trial if she 
were able to testify. In addition, the prosecutor advised jurors that they could convict 
Todd of murder even if they did not consider evidence of the gun: according to the 
prosecutor, the jury could base a murder conviction on the fact that Todd did not stop the 
truck when Stephanie grabbed onto it as Todd drove away. The prosecutor argued facts 
not in evidence and made misstatements. That constitutes error. 
In this case, the error was prejudicial. The pivotal issue before the jury concerned 
Todd's state of mind when Stephanie was shot. The jury was required to make a determi-
nation as to whether Todd's conduct was intentional, knowing, depraved, reckless or 
negligent. The defendant's evidence for a lesser offense in the matter was compelling: it 
supported that Stephanie held onto the steering column with one hand, and she held the 
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gun with the other hand when it accidentally discharged. Evidence supported the lesser-
included offense of reckless manslaughter or even negligent homicide. Notwithstanding, 
the jury convicted Todd of murder. Jurors likely were unduly and improperly influenced 
by the prosecutor's references to what Stephanie would have said if she were able to 
testify, and by the prosecutor's claims that jurors may convict Todd of murder even if 
they did not consider evidence of the gun. That constitutes prejudice. 
Finally, the issue on appeal is properly before this Court. This Court may decide it 
on the merits. In that regard, Todd respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
conviction for murder and remand the case for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENT. TODD WAS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL AS A RESULT 
OF THE MISCONDUCT. 
During closing argument the prosecutor made remarks that called the attention of 
jurors to circumstances they were not justified in considering to reach a verdict of murder 
in this case. Specifically, the prosecutor advised jurors that they could find Todd guilty 
of murder even if they did not consider evidence of the gun. According to the 
prosecutor, the jurors could convict Todd based on the fact that Stephanie jumped onto 
the truck while it was moving and Todd tried to push her off. (See R. 676:21, 23.) 
Also, the prosecutor made reference during closing argument to what Stephanie 
would have said if she were able to testify at trial. (R. 676:25-29.) That argument was 
meant to encourage jurors to exact revenge for Stephanie. It was improper. As a result 
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of the misconduct, Todd requested that the court declare a mistrial, pursuant to the rules 
of criminal procedure. (R. 676:32.) 
Rule 24 governs when a court may declare a mistrial or order a new trial based on 
prosecutorial misconduct. Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) (2003). The rule provides that a 
defendant may be entitled to a new trial "if there is any error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) (2003). A 
trial court has discretion under Rule 24 to grant a new trial, and an appellate court will not 
disturb the trial court's ruling unless it appears that the trial court has abused its discretion 
to the prejudice of the defendant. See State v. Smith. 776 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 
1989): see also State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 265-66, 276 (Utah 1998). 
In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct has deprived defendant of a fair 
trial, Utah appellate courts have applied a two-part test: 
[This test examines whether] "[1] the actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call to 
the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result." 
Basta, 966 P.2d at 268 (quoting Tennev. 913 P.2d at 754); Troy, 688 P.2d at 486; Reed. 
2000 UT 68,118. 
The first step is met when the prosecutor makes statements during closing argu-
ment to invoke the sympathies and passions of the jury and when the prosecutor misstates 
application of the law to the facts. See ABA Stds for Crim. Justice: Prosecution Function 
and Defense Function, §§ 3-5.8 to 3-5.9 (3d ed. 1993). The second part of the test is more 
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difficult. State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991). It refers to the prejudice analy-
sis. "If the prejudice is such that there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would have 
reached a more favorable result absent the comments, we will reverse." State v. Pearson, 
943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997). As set forth below, Todd has met both parts of the test. 
A. THE CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
In this case, the prosecutor mislead and confused the jury concerning application 
of the law to the facts, and called the jury's attention to matters they were not justified in 
considering. Specifically, the prosecutor argued as follows: 
Under [subsection (b) for murder, "]intends to cause serious bodily 
injury[ff], again, the defendant himself told you he wanted Stephanie off of the 
vehicle. She jumped on the vehicle. He admitted he drove through the parking lot. 
He admitted that he didn't slow down for her to jump off He admitted that he 
thought there was no reason why she couldn't just let go. 
Twenty miles per hour, 30 miles per hour, not quick speeds on the freeway, 
but in a parking lot when you're hanging onto the side of a lifted-up vehicle, extre-
mely fast speeds, extremely dangerous conduct. Trying to push someone off a 
moving car in a parking lot is an act that is intended to cause serious bodily injury. 
And if you add to that a gun, even if the defendant were merely pushing her with 
the gun, certainly you can find that the defendant intended to cause Stephanie 
serious bodily injury and that in doing that he caused her death. 
* * * 
And you would have to find that the defendant engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to another. Of course pushing a loaded firearm into 
someone's head would create a grave risk of death. But I submit to you if the 
defendant didn't have a gun in this situation, if all you had were the defendant 
driving across the parking lot with a young woman hanging on the outside of his 
car and him pushing her off of the car, if that had been the situation and he had 
pushed her off the Blazer and she had been pulled under the wheels and killed, you 
would still have murder. But in this situation the defendant added a firearm. 
(R. 676:20-21, 22-23.) The prosecutor also stated the following during closing argument. 
Now, the defendant spent a considerable amount of time with Lieutenant 
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Nosack and Detective Soper. I think four to five hours was the testimony. An 
interview with them telling them his version or in this case many several different 
versions of what happened that night. And he also had the opportunity to come up 
on the stand and to testify and to tell you his version of what happened that night. 
But Stephanie didn't get to do that. And I can tell you that Stephanie surely would 
have liked to have sat down with the investigators and spent four or five hours 
telling them her version of what happened that night. And Stephanie would have 
liked to have come into this courtroom and told you what happened that night. 
And as you go through and you consider the evidence that you heard, you'll 
find that it's pretty clear what Stephanie would have told you if she had been here. 
Stephanie would have told you that in September of 1998 she and the defendant 
separated. And that she was trying hard as a single mom with three kids to make 
ends meet, to pay the bills. And she was struggling but she was doing it. 
And she would tell you that in February of 1998 [sic: 1999] she finally was 
able to get the defendant to agree to give her the title to a Blazer that she had been 
driving since September. And that when she got the title she was able to go out 
and go to the bank and get a loan on the Blazer, a loan for $1,300. Money that she 
told her mother she was very excited about having. She was going to be able to 
pay off some of her bills, start fresh, start new. 
And Stephanie would tell you about her frustration that day, February 28th, 
when she came out of the house in the afternoon to find that the Blazer was gone. 
She probably would tell you that she immediately knew who took it. That she 
called the police and tried to get the police to help her retrieve the Blazer. But the 
police weren't able to help her because it was a civil problem. It was still marital 
property and the defendant legally was not guilty of theft for taking the Blazer. 
And she would tell you how frustrated she was to not only have lost the 
Blazer, but to have lost her purse with the $1,300 cash. And here she was, no car, 
no money, and a $1,300 loan. Stephanie would probably tell you that when she 
talked to the defendant and he agreed to meet her and he told her he would give 
her back the Blazer, he told her he would return her purse with the money, she 
would tell you she was relieved. She was so glad that the defendant was going to 
meet her. But she was worried there might be problems, so she asked two of her 
friends to come and be at the parking lot just in case. She asked John Dinga and 
Troy Roberts to come. And, in fact, the plan was that she was going to go with her 
brother, who the defendant knew and trusted, to Hometown Buffet. The two 
friends would wait across the street in the other parking lot. 
Stephanie would tell you that it wasn't her design to have them pull Shayne 
out of the vehicle and take the vehicle. She just wanted them there in case there 
were problems so that they could help her. She didn't plan for them to be two cars 
away. She didn't plan for the exchange to take place in the Wal-Mart parking lot. 
And she would tell you that when the defendant pulled up and handed her 
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brother Kelly an empty purse and wasn't ready to turn over the Blazer, that she got 
mad and she got out of the car and she went over to the defendant's window to let 
him know how mad she was. And you can understand how angry she must have 
been. 
And she would tell you that when it became clear that the defendant was 
about to drive away, she wanted to stop him. He had her money, her $1,300. How 
was show [sic: she] going to pay that back? And he had the Blazer, the only car 
that she had. And so she grabbed onto the Blazer to try to stop him. 
And if Stephanie were here she would probably tell you that she regretted 
her decision to grab onto the Blazer as soon as she did it, because the defendant 
didn't stop, he kept going. And I think Stephanie would tell you that it was a 
pretty frightening ride. That the parking lot was bumpy, the suspension was high, 
when she put her feet down they rubbed on the pavement, you can see that from 
the scuffing on the sandals. And Stephanie would tell you that she held onto that 
vehicle with everything that she could, because she was afraid that if she let go she 
would have been dragged under the wheels and crushed by the car. Stephanie 
would tell you that she felt like if she let go of that Blazer she would be killed. 
Stephanie would tell you that she didn't reach into the vehicle to grab the 
gun because she couldn't see into the defendant's lap. And she couldn't see on the 
seat between the defendant's legs. She might tell you that the defendant told you 
the truth when he was the one who said, Stephanie, I have a gun. She would tell 
you that the defendant kept telling her to let go. She would tell you that she 
screamed at the defendant and begged him to stop the car. I think Stephanie would 
tell you that she looked back hoping somebody was coming to help her. And that 
as she had her head turned away looking behind her, maybe she could see her 
brother, that she could feel the barrel of the gun pressed up against her head. But 
there wasn't anything she could do. And she'd probably tell you that she hoped 
the defendant wouldn't pull the trigger. She may even tell you that she tried to 
push the gun away but there was little she could do because it was too hard to let 
go of the truck. And she had a decision to make and she decided to keep holding 
on with everything that she had. 
* * * 
I think Stephanie would tell you that the defendant was pushing against her 
head with the gun. That she was trying to get her head away from the gun. And 
Stephanie would tell you that she didn't even see the defendant pull the trigger. 
That all she felt was an explosion in her head as she fell to the ground. And if 
Stephanie were here, she would have come up and sat in that witness chair and she 
would have pointed at the defendant and she would have said, that man seated 
right there in between his two attorneys murdered me on February 28, 1999. 
(R. 676:25-29.) 
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At the conclusion of the prosecutor's remarks, defense counsel objected to the 
above statements and requested that the court declare a mistrial. (R. 676:30-32.) 
The prosecutor responded that counsel's objections were untimely. (R. 676:33.) 
After considering the matter, the judge denied the mistrial motion as follows: 
Okay. Your objections are noted. I'm not sure whether they're timely [or not], 
Mr. Finlayson. But they are on the record. The Court is going to deny your 
motion for a mistrial. The Court will instruct the injury [sic: jury] after your 
closing and rebuttal to again deliberate only biased [sic: based] on the evidence 
they've heard and has been admitted. And they are not to be guided simply by 
passion or prejudice or arguments. That the attorneys are arguing, not testifying. 
So if you would remind me I'll make sure that I reemphasize that to the jury. But 
other than that you've made your record and your motion is denied. 
(R. 676:33.) A copy of the relevant pages from the closing argument are attached hereto 
as Addendum D. 
Defense counsel then presented closing argument followed by the state's rebuttal. 
(See R. 676:34-84.) Thereafter, the judge provided a "curative" instruction to the jury: 
Before I have the jury go in to deliberate I want to remind you one more time that 
there are jury instructions that say you should not be guided by passion or 
prejudice. You are to decide this case on the facts. Okay? And only on the facts. 
And I also remind you that what you've heard is closing argument from the 
attorneys. They are not testifying. They are not under oath. They are arguing what 
they interpret or remember the facts to be. You also have your own independent re-
collection of what the facts are and you'll have the group as a whole to remember 
what the facts are. Decide the case on what you remember the facts to be. Okay? 
(R. 676:84-85.) The jury was excused to deliberate. 
During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the judge, as follows: 
The question that the jury sent out was, ["]The defense in their closing 
indicated that the only act we were to consider was the shooting of the gun.["] In 
parentheses - then in parentheses, ["]which was the actual action which led to 
19 
Stephanie's death. Mr. Finlayson["] - they got your name right - [,f]said we were 
not to consider the drive - not to consider the drive through the parking lot with 
Stephanie hanging onto the Blazer as part of the act that led to her death; is this 
correct?[n] 
(R. 677:8.) 
The judge indicated that his response to the jury's question was as follows: 
My response to the jury was you can - the fact that she was hanging onto 
the Blazer was the factual testimony that was factual, but that in regards to their 
question, they had to look to the jury instructions for any answers. So that was the 
response that was given by the Court. All right? 
(R. 677:8.) The jury's question during deliberations was relevant because it went to the 
heart of the improper comments made by the prosecutor.3 That is, the jury questioned 
which evidence was proper to consider in deliberations. 
In this case, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury found Todd guilty of mur-
der because Todd did not stop the Blazer when Stephanie jumped on. Stated another way, 
the prosecutor's improper arguments so influenced the jury that it likely found Todd 
guilty of murder based on a possibility that Stephanie would be injured if she tried to 
jump from the truck. Also, the prosecutor improperly referenced what Stephanie would 
have said at trial. The misconduct compels reversal, as further explained below. 
3 Although Todd identified a separate issue on appeal in the docketing statement relating 
to the jury's question, Todd is not raising a separate issue here. (See Docketing Statement, 
dated March 14, 2003, at 6.) Rather, in this brief on appeal, Todd has made reference to 
the jury's question because it shows that the jury was confused as a result of the prose-
cutor's improper statements during closing argument. See infra sub-point C , herein. 
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B. THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENTS CALLED THE ATTENTION OF 
THE JURORS TO MATTERS THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO CONSIDER. 
Considering the first part of the analysis for prosecutorial misconduct, Rule 3.4(e), 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, provides that a lawyer may not allude to any matter 
"that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by 
admissible evidence[.],f Utah R. Prof. Cond. 3.4(e) (2003); see also Troy. 688 P.2d at 486 
(counsel may not refer to matters the jury is not justified in considering). 
Specifically, a prosecutor is "precluded from arguing matters not in evidence." 
See State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989); State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339, 344 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("A comment by a prosecutor during closing argument that the jury 
consider matters outside the evidence is prosecutorial misconduct"). 
Also, a prosecutor is prohibited from using argument calculated to inflame the 
passions or prejudices of the jury. See ABA Stds Crim. Justice: Prosecution Function and 
Defense Function, § 3-5.8(c). For example, a prosecutor is prohibited from asking jurors 
to put themselves in the victim's place. See Com, v. Cherry, 378 A.2d 800, 803 (Pa. 
1977) (counsel may not make statements appealing to the emotions of the jury). Also, 
courts condemn references to the deceased victim and her requests for revenge. See 
Williford v. State, 235 S.E.2d 625 (Ga. App. 1977) (prosecutor's references, to the victim 
as a married man with a new baby that he's not able to see, were held improper; trial 
judge admonished prosecutor in front of the jury and ordered an apology, curing error). 
The prosecutor is prohibited from making reference to what a victim might have 
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said at trial if s/he were able to testify in the matter. In Com, v. Harvell 327 A.2d 27 (Pa. 
1974), the defendant was charged with several crimes including murder. Id at 28. 
During closing argument at trial, the prosecutor made statements appealing to the jury's 
passions and sympathies, and he made reference to what the victim would have said if he 
could "come back here and sit in this chair and talk with you." Id at 29. The trial judge 
found the remarks to be within the permissible bounds of proper advocacy. However, 
the appellate court ruled that the remarks "clearly exceeded the limits" delineated in the 
law and set forth in the ABA Standards for Prosecutor's Functions. IcL at 29-30. The 
court considered it "unprofessional" for a lawyer intentionally to argue facts that were not 
of record. IcL at 30-31. It reversed the case and ordered a new trial. Id 
In State v. Leon. 945 P.2d 1290 (Ariz. 1997), defendant was charged and 
convicted of drug distribution. On appeal, defendant argued prosecutorial misconduct, 
where the prosecutor attempted to place the prestige of the government behind his case, 
and he made repeated references during closing arguments to police reports not in 
evidence. Id at 1291-92. The defendant objected to the improper statements, and the 
trial judge sustained the objections, strongly reprimanded the prosecutor, and provided a 
curative instruction to the jury. Id. at 1292. After the jury began deliberations, the 
defense requested a mistrial, which the trial court denied. Id On appeal, the Arizona 
Supreme Court reversed the case and stated the following: 
The attorney continued to violate standards of appropriate conduct at the 
conclusion of the trial. Although advocates are ordinarily given wide latitude in 
closing argument, their comments must still be "based on facts the jury is entitled 
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to find from the evidence and not on extraneous matters that were not or could not 
be received in evidence."... Here, nothing was admitted pertaining to previous 
drug transactions, which alone should have precluded the state from mentioning 
them in closing.... Similarly, by implying that police reports contained other 
"bad acts," the deputy county attorney referred to matters not in evidence and 
presumably inadmissible under Rule 404, Ariz.R.Evid. This misconduct was 
particularly egregious considering that the court had earlier excluded statements 
regarding a prior incident because they had not been formally disclosed in 
advance of trial. 
Id. at 1293 (cites omitted at ellipses). The court remanded the case for a new trial. IdL 
When the prosecutor uses closing argument to incite the jurors' passions, preju-
dices and sympathies, it has a substantial impact on a defendant's case. The argument 
introduces irrelevant and irrational information into the decision making process. "State-
ments which suggest that a jury has an obligation to convict a defendant on some basis 
other than solely on the evidence before it are improper and beyond the broad latitude 
allowed in closing argument." State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986). 
In Todd's case, the prosecutor's references in closing argument to how Stephanie 
would have testified at trial served to invoke the jury's sympathy for Stephanie, and to 
encourage the jury to exact revenge for her. The remarks suggested that the jury should 
render a verdict based on passion rather than the facts of the case. Obviously, 
Stephanie's statements were not in evidence. Nevertheless, the prosecutor made the 
improper remarks apparently to counter Todd's testimony and the physical evidence 
supporting his account of the events. 
To explain, the pivotal issue in this matter concerned Todd's state of mind when 
the gun discharged. Todd testified that Stephanie grabbed the gun, and he tried to take it 
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from her when it accidentally discharged. (R. 673:777-780.) Todd's evidence was 
consistent with the physical evidence at trial. (See R. 674:949-50, 954-55, 959 (tear on 
Stephanie's right hand would be consistent with her hand on the barrel as it discharged); 
674:1036-37 (investigator discovered palm print on the gun barrel); see also R. 669:191 
(Roberts did not see a gun in Todd's hand when Todd lifted his arm).) The evidence 
supported negligent or even reckless conduct on Todd's part. See State v. Bindrup, 655 
P.2d 674, 676 (Utah 1982) (reckless conduct does not support murder conviction). 
To refute Todd's testimony, the prosecutor based her closing argument on matters 
that could not be received in evidence: an account of the events from Stephanie. The 
prosecutor's closing argument referenced what Stephanie would have said if she were 
able to testify. According to the prosecutor, Stephanie's version of events would have 
been in sharp contrast with Todd's testimony. (R. 676:25-29.) Since Stephanie was 
unable to tell her side of the story, the prosecutor served as the unsworn surrogate for her. 
The prosecutor claimed that if Stephanie were able to testify, she would have 
"told" the jury the following: [1] In September of 1998 she and the defendant separated. 
[2] She was a single mom with three kids trying to make ends meet. [3] She finally was 
able to get a loan on the Blazer for $1,300. [4] Stephanie was frustrated when she saw the 
Blazer, her purse and the money gone on February 28, 1999. [5] Stephanie asked police 
to help her recover the property; the police refused to get involved. [6] Stephanie 
arranged to meet with Todd at the Hometown Buffet parking lot. She asked two friends 
and her brother to help her. [7] During the meeting with Todd, Stephanie learned that 
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Todd did not return the money. [8] Also, Todd refused to return the Blazer, "the only car 
that she had." (R. 676:27.) [9] Although Stephanie grabbed onto the Blazer as Todd 
drove away, she immediately regretted her decision to do that. (R. 676:28.) 
[10] And I think Stephanie would tell you that it was a pretty frightening ride. 
That the parking lot was bumpy, the suspension was high, when she put her feet 
down they rubbed on the pavement, you can see that from the scuffing on the 
sandals. And Stephanie would tell you that she held onto that vehicle with 
everything that she could, because she was afraid that if she let go she would have 
been dragged under the wheels and crushed by the car. Stephanie would tell you 
that she felt like if she let go of that Blazer she would be killed. 
(R. 676:28.) 
[11] "Stephanie would tell you that she didn't reach into the vehicle to grab the 
gun because she couldn't see into the defendant's lap." (Id.) [12] "She would tell you 
that she screamed at the defendant and begged him to stop the car. I think Stephanie 
would tell you that she looked back hoping somebody was coming to help her. And that 
as she had her head turned away looking behind her, maybe she could see her brother, that 
she could feel the barrel of the gun pressed up against her head." (Id.) [13] "She may 
even tell you that she tried to push the gun away." (R. 676:29.) [14] "And Stephanie 
would tell you that she didn't even see the defendant pull the trigger. That all she felt was 
an explosion in her head as she fell to the ground." (Id.) [15] And Stephanie would point 
her finger at the defendant and say, "that man seated right there in between his two 
attorneys murdered me on February 28, 1999." (Id.) 
The prosecutor's statements violated the law. See Utah R. Prof. Cond. 3.4(e) 
(2003); Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87; Hopkins, 782 P.2d at 478; Palmer, 860 P.2d at 344 ("A 
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comment by a prosecutor during closing argument that the jury consider matters outside 
the evidence is prosecutorial misconduct"); Cherry, 378 A.2d at 803 (a prosecutor's 
expression of personal opinion regarding a defendant's guilt is prejudicial and amounts to 
reversible error; also, it is improper for a prosecutor to reference what the victim might 
have said). 
The statements attributable to Stephanie were inappropriate, insupportable embel-
lishments. They unfairly exploited the jury's sympathies and sense of revenge, and they 
clouded the factual issues. (R. 676:25 ("And I can tell you that Stephanie surely would 
have liked to have sat down with the investigators and spent four or five hours telling 
them her version of what happened that night. And Stephanie would have liked to have 
come into this courtroom and told you what happened that night").) 
Next, the prosecutor went further with the misconduct when she advised jurors that 
the facts supported murder, even if "all [they] had were the defendant driving across the 
parking lot with a young woman hanging on the outside of his car and him pushing her 
off of the car." (R. 676:23; see also 676:21.) That was a misstatement of application of 
the law to the facts in this case. 
Here, according to the evidence Todd did not push Stephanie off the truck. Also, 
the state's expert testified that the bruises and abrasions that Stephanie received that night 
(R. 670:241) did not contribute to her death. (R. 670:277.) Thus, the prosecutor's 
statement that the jury could convict on that basis, even without the gun, was misleading. 
See e.g. State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 503-05 (Utah 1986) (the crime of attempted 
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murder is supported by evidence that defendant's conduct was intentional and knowing, 
but did not result in victim's death) 
Before jurors could convict Todd of homicide, they were required to consider 
circumstances surrounding the cause of death. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203, - 205, -206 
(1999) (criminal homicide occurs when defendant "causes the death" of another). Since 
Stephanie died from a gun shot wound to the head (R. 670:275), the evidence surrounding 
the gun was pivotal here. The prosecutor's statement that the jury could convict Todd 
even without the gun encouraged jurors to ignore a critical element in the matter: the 
defendant's state of mind as it related to cause of death. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-
203(1), - 205(1), -206(1). That was improper. See ABA Stds Crim. Justice: Prosecution 
Function and Defense Function, § 3-5.8(a) (n[t]he prosecutor should not intentionally 
misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw"). 
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, 
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution 
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a 
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is 
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
Bergerv.U.S.. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Also, 
"A criminal trial is a neutral arena wherein both sides place evidence for 
the jury's consideration; the role of counsel in closing argument is to assist the jury 
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in analyzing that evidence, not to obscure the jury's view with personal opinion, 
emotion, and nonrecord evidence[.]M 
Johns v. State. 832 So.2d 959, 963 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (cite omitted). 
In this case, the prosecutor's statements in closing argument were misleading and 
diverted the jury from its duty to decide the facts impartially. The statements took jurors 
away from their responsibility to resolve the case objectively and dispassionately on the 
evidence. That was improper. See ABA Stds for Crim. Justice Prosecution Function and 
Defense Function, § 3-5.8(d) (a prosecutor may not "divert the jury from its duty to 
decide the case on the evidence"). Todd has met the first prong in establishing that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial/new trial for 
prosecutorial misconduct. See Basta, 966 P.2d at 268 (identifying two-prong analysis). 
C. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. THE ERROR WAS 
SUBSTANTIAL AND PREJUDICIAL. REQUIRING REVERSAL. 
A prosecutor's misconduct constitutes reversible error when the error is "substan-
tial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there 
would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7 
(Utah 1993) (cites omitted); Harmon. 956 P.2d at 276; see also Trov. 688 P.2d at 486-87; 
Andreason. 718 P.2d at 403. 
In Troy, 688 P.2d at 486, the prosecutor committed misconduct when he referred 
to defendant's alias, his changed identity under a federal program, and his "various 
criminal matters," and when he compared the defendant to criminals who have "all kinds 
of irrational behavior ... Hinckley is a classic example." Id. The supreme court ruled that 
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the conduct warranted a new trial: the jury likely was influenced by the misconduct. Id.; 
see also State v. Wiswell 639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981); State v. Bvrd. 937 P.2d 532, 
536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Utah App. 1997). 
Utah courts have ruled that prosecutorial misconduct is prejudicial when the jury is 
presented with conflicting evidence and the misconduct focuses on the pivotal issue. 
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486; Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536; Andreason. 718 P.2d at 403 ("When the 
evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely 
influenced by an improper argument"). 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or 
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that 
they will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such 
cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the 
evidence. They may be especially susceptible to influence, and a small degree of 
influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict. 
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486; Andreason. 718 P.2d at 403. 
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice also recognize that a prosecutor's 
misconduct in closing argument unduly influences the jury: 
The prosecutor's argument is likely to have significant persuasive force with the 
jury. Accordingly, the scope of argument must be consistent with the evidence and 
marked by the fairness that should characterize all of the prosecutor's conduct. 
Prosecutorial conduct in argument is a matter of special concern because of the 
possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor's arguments, not 
only because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor's office, but also 
because of the fact-finding facilities presumably available to the office. 
Unfortunately, some prosecutors have permitted an excess of zeal for con-
viction or a fancy for exaggerated rhetoric to carry them beyond the permissible 
limits of argument. Of course, a prosecutor must be free to present argument with 
logical force and vigor. Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has remarked, "while 
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." 
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ABA Stds Crim. Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function: §3-5.8, 
commentary (notes omitted). 
1. The Prosecutor's References in Closing Argument to What Stephanie Would 
Have Told Jurors Were Prejudicial. 
In this case, the misconduct was prejudicial where the prosecutor used manipula-
tive tactics to divert the jury's attention from the pivotal issues. (See supra, sub-point A. 
& B., herein.) Specifically, the prosecutor as surrogate for Stephanie, structured an 
unsworn statement for Stephanie that conflicted with Todd's testimony and the physical 
evidence here. The unsworn statement went to the critical issues in the case and was 
meant to mislead the jury on those issues. (See supra, sub-points A. and B., herein.) 
For example, according to the evidence, Stephanie arranged to meet with Todd at a 
parking lot on February 28 to collect her personal property from him. (R. 673:764.) As 
Stephanie and Kelly Oliver drove up to Todd, Stephanie immediately got out of the car 
and walked over to the Blazer. She began to argue with Todd; she told him that "her 
people were there" and she needed the truck. (R. 669: 132-34; 673:774, 856, 859.)4 
Meanwhile, Todd handed Stephanie's purse to Kelly. Stephanie did not know that the 
purse was empty. (See R. 669:132, 134) 
The evidence supports that as Stephanie continued to argue with Todd, he began to 
drive away. (See R. 669:185-86.) His conduct was not unreasonable: Stephanie had told 
4 Stephanie had arranged for two friends to be in the area when she met with Todd. The 
friends were Dinga and Roberts. (See R. 672:683, 685.) Dinga and Roberts had 
threatened Todd earlier. (R. 673:741-42, 798, 814, 929, 931; 672:654.) 
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him her people were there and Todd felt threatened by Roberts and Dinga. See supra, 
note 4, herein. The parties could resolve the property issues later. 
As Todd began to leave, Stephanie escalated the situation: She jumped onto the 
moving Blazer. (R. 673:775.) Her conduct was irrational, possibly due to the 
intoxicating levels of methamphetamine in her system. (R. 670:269.) The evidence 
presented factual issues for the jury. 
Notwithstanding the evidence, the prosecutor suggested in closing argument that 
Stephanie's conduct was rational. She claimed that if Stephanie were able to testify, she 
would tell the jury that when she met Todd in the parking lot, she was angry at him 
because she learned that her purse was empty. (R. 676:27; but see R. 669:132, 134 
(Stephanie did not know the purse was empty).) The prosecutor stated, "And you can 
understand how angry she must have been." (R. 676:27-28.) Also, the prosecutor 
claimed that Stephanie would tell the jury that when Todd began to drive away, she 
wanted to stop him because he had her money. (Id.) The evidence did not support such a 
theory. (See R. 669:132, 134 (Stephanie did not know about the empty purse).) 
The prosecutor further claimed that Stephanie would tell the jury that when she 
grabbed onto the moving truck, she immediately "regretted her decision." (R. 676:28.) 
"[I]t was a pretty frightening ride." "And Stephanie would tell you that she held onto that 
vehicle with everything that she could, because she was afraid that if she let go she would 
have been dragged under the wheels and crushed by the car." (R. 676:28; but see 673: 
777-78 (Stephanie held onto Todd and she grabbed for the gun); 669:191 (Roberts did not 
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see a gun in Todd's hand when Todd raised his arm).) Yet, Stephanie was keyed up; she 
was not afraid. (R. 670:269.) The prosecutor's misconduct went to pivotal factual issues. 
Next, the physical evidence supported Todd's testimony that after Stephanie 
grabbed onto the moving Blazer, she held onto the steering column with her left hand (see 
R. 670:323; 673:776-77, 849 (dust on the steering wheel was disturbed)). She held the 
barrel of the gun with her right hand. As Todd tried to take the gun from her, it acciden-
tally discharged. (R. 674:949-50, 954-55, 959 (tear on Stephanie's right hand was 
consistent with her hand on the barrel as it discharged); 674:1036-37 (investigator 
discovered palm print on the gun barrel); 669:191 (Roberts did not see a gun in Todd's 
hand).) The evidence supported a conviction for the lesser-included offense of reckless 
manslaughter or even negligent homicide. (R. 481-83; 488-91 (jury advised of lesser 
offenses).) The defense was credible, given the physical evidence and Stephanie's 
irrational behavior and intoxicated state. (R. 670:269.) 
Notwithstanding the credible evidence, the prosecutor claimed that Stephanie 
would provide rational explanations to support the state's theory: Stephanie would say 
that "she didn't reach into the vehicle to grab the gun," "she could feel the barrel of the 
gun pressed up against her head," and "[s]he may even tell you that she tried to push the 
gun away." (R. 676:28-29.) According to the prosecutor, Stephanie also would point at 
Todd and say, "that man seated right there in between his two attorneys murdered me on 
February 28, 1999." (LI (emphasis added).) 
In the end, this case came down to the physical evidence supporting Todd's 
32 
testimony versus the state's theory. The jury was required to weigh conflicting evidence 
to reach a verdict. Thus, in the context of this case, there is a greater likelihood that the 
jury was improperly influenced by the prosecutor's misleading statements and references 
to evidence not in the record. See Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87 (finding that the prosecutorial 
misconduct likely influenced the jury); Byrd 937 P.2d at 536. 
Stated another way, absent the misconduct, there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
jury would have found Todd guilty of a lesser offense. .See State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 
1116, 1122-23 (Utah 1989) (the prejudice analysis considers whether the jury could have 
found defendant guilty of something other than first degree murder). The jury could 
have found him guilty of negligent homicide or reckless manslaughter. Apparently, the 
prosecutor considered that prospect to be daunting. She circumvented the rules to bolster 
her case for murder. The prosecutor's tactics in misleading the jury should not be 
reinforced with a finding of harmless error. The error was prejudicial requiring reversal. 
2. Where the Prosecutor Urged the Jury to Disregard Relevant Facts, that 
Constituted Prejudicial Error. 
Next, the prosecutor told jurors they could convict Todd even "if all [they] had 
were the defendant driving across the parking lot with a young woman hanging on the 
outside of his car and him pushing her off of the car." (R. 676:23; see also id, at 21.) 
The prosecutor should have been aware that such a statement in the context of this case 
was misleading and prejudicial. (See supra, sub-point B., herein.) 
Specifically, when the prosecutor tried to elicit testimony earlier at trial from a 
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witness to suggest that Stephanie could not safely let go of the truck, the trial court 
sustained an objection, prohibiting the question. (R. 669:86.) In addition, the state did 
not present evidence in this case to suggest that Stephanie would have died from falling 
off the Blazer. (See e.g. 670:275, 277.) In fact, the state's expert testified that while 
Stephanie sustained bruises and lacerations from the fall, those injuries did not contribute 
to her death. (R. 670:277.) Stephanie died from a gun shot to the head. (R. 670:275.) 
In this case, before jurors could find Todd criminally responsible for Stephanie's 
death, they would have to consider Todd's mental state at the time of the shooting: they 
would have to consider evidence of the gun. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-101, -102; 76-
5-203(1), -205(1), -206(1) (1999). Notwithstanding, the prosecutor improperly urged 
jurors to ignore that evidence and still render a guilty verdict for murder. (R. 676:22-23.) 
The error was prejudicial. Evidence regarding the gun was in conflict. The state 
argued that Todd intentionally or knowingly placed the gun to Stephanie's head, while 
Todd testified that after Stephanie grabbed the gun from his lap, he tried to take it from 
her when it discharged. (See R. 673:778-80.) Here, the prosecutor's misconduct went to 
a pivotal issue. Thus, there is a greater likelihood that the jury was improperly influenced 
by the prosecutor's misconduct. See Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87 (finding that the 
prosecutorial misconduct likely influenced the jury); Byrd 937 P.2d at 536. 
Also, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have found Todd guilty 
of the lesser offense of negligent homicide or reckless manslaughter. See Mitchell, 779 
P.2d at 1122-23 (the prejudice analysis considers whether there was a basis for the jury to 
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find defendant guilty of something other than first degree murder). Absent the 
prosecutorial misconduct, the jury would have properly considered the evidence relating 
to the gun and likely concluded that the shooting was negligent or reckless. (See supra, 
pp. 30-34.) That reasonable likelihood compels the determination that the misconduct 
was prejudicial in this case. 
Next, the jury here was plainly confused as to whether it could convict Todd based 
simply on the evidence that Todd drove through the parking lot with Stephanie hanging 
onto the Blazer. (R. 677:8 (jury questioned the evidence it had to consider).) 
In the end, jurors likely did not deliberate the gun evidence because the prosecutor 
said they did not have to. Thus, the jury likely rendered a verdict for murder without 
assessing Todd's state of mind in connection with Stephanie's cause of death. In that 
regard, Todd's right to fair trial and his right to have the jury reach an unanimous verdict 
on an essential element of an offense was affected. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 
Tf62, 992 P.2d 951. That constitutes prejudice. See State v. Casev, 2003 UT 33, Tf40, 482 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (prejudice exists if it affects the substantial rights of a party). 
Todd maintained in this case that he did not intentionally or knowingly shoot 
Stephanie. (See R. 673:778-80, 788, 790.) His conduct as it related to the shooting did 
not constitute depraved indifference. Absent the misconduct, based on the evidence 
presented at trial that the gun discharged when Todd tried to take it from Stephanie, there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have convicted Todd of a lesser offense. 
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The prosecutor's improper statements tipped the balance against Todd. Jurors 
likely were influenced by the prosecutor's improper references to what Stephanie would 
have said, and by the prosecutor's statements that jurors could convict Todd even if they 
did not consider evidence of the gun. 
Todd has demonstrated prejudice as a result of the prosecutorial misconduct. The 
trial court abused its discretion in failing to declare a mistrial. 
D. THE "CURATIVE" INSTRUCTION PROVIDED BY THE COURT AFTER 
CLOSING ARGUMENT WAS INEFFECTIVE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that curative instructions "are a settled and 
necessary feature of our judicial process and one of the most important tools by which a 
court may remedy errors at trial." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 271; see also State v. Longshaw, 
961 P.2d 925, 929-30 (Utah App. 1998). The supreme court also has recognized that 
curative instructions "are not always sufficient to avoid the potential prejudice to the 
defendant. [State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1988)]. The potential for prejudice 
is greatest when the circumstantial facts are closely related to the issue the jury must 
ultimately decide." State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1993). "This court 
acknowledges that curative instructions are not without defect or limitation." Harmon, 
956P.2dat273n.9. 
In Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that curative instructions are not 
a "cure-all." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273. Also, to neutralize the damage of prosecutorial 
misconduct, a curative instruction should be prompt, effective, and strong. See id. at 272 
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(citing, inter alia, U.S. v. Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A] prompt 
and effective admonishment of counsel or curative instruction from the trial judge may 
effectively 'neutralize the damage5") (quoting U.S. v. SimtoK 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th 
Cir. 1990)); U.S. v. Diaz-Carreon. 915 F.2d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 1990) (court's strong 
curative instruction and condemnation of prosecutor's tactics neutralized damaging effect 
of improper prosecutorial remarks)); see also Harmon, 956 P.2d at 278 (Durham, J., con-
curring) (it is significantly likely that "our collective confidence in the curative instruc-
tion as a valuable 'tool' is not substantiated by reality"); see also State v. Boyatt 854 
P.2d 550, 555 (Utah App. 1993) (no prosecutorial misconduct where trial court provided 
complete instruction on the law and directed jury to follow law as stated by court). 
In this case, after the prosecutor made the improper statements in closing 
argument, the defense objected and the judge stated he would provide a limited 
"curative" instruction to the jury after the state's final rebuttal argument. (R. 676:33.) 
The "curative" instruction was as follows: 
Before I have the jury in to deliberate I want to remind you one more time 
that there are jury instructions that say you should not be guided by passion or 
prejudice. You are to decide this case on the facts. Okay? And only on the facts. 
And I also remind you that what you've heard is closing argument from the 
attorneys. They are not testifying. They are not under oath. They are arguing what 
they interpret or remember the facts to be. You also have your own independent re-
collection of what the facts are and you'll have the group as a whole to remember 
what the facts are. Decide the case on what you remember the facts to be. Okay? 
(R. 676:84-85.) 
The "curative" instruction here was ineffective for several reasons. 
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First, the timing of the instruction had no impact on or relationship to the 
prosecutor's improper statements. Since it was provided well after the prosecutor made 
the misstatements (compare R. 676:20-29, and 676:84), the jury would have no reason to 
relate the instruction to the prosecutorial misconduct. 
Second, the curative instruction was meaningless. Where the judge advised the 
jury that the attorneys were not testifying and they were not under oath, that did not con-
vey to jurors that closing argument did not constitute evidence. It did not convey to 
jurors that they could not consider statements in deliberations made by the prosecutor. 
In fact, the curative instruction incorrectly advised jurors that the attorneys based 
their arguments on "what they interpret or remember the facts to be." (R. 676:84.) In this 
case, the prosecutor's argument in relevant part was not based on her recollection of the 
facts. Rather, it was based on matters not in evidence: what Stephanie would have said if 
she were able to testify. In that regard, the "curative" instruction failed to properly warn 
the jury that the prosecutor's argument was improper under the law. 
Also, the "curative" instruction did not effectively admonish the prosecutor for the 
misstatements, it did not serve to clarify the misstatements or otherwise direct the jury to 
the correct substantive law to cure the impact of the improper statements, and it did not 
condemn the prosecutor's tactics to neutralize the references to what Stephanie would 
have said. The "curative" instruction had no relationship to the damaging remarks, it was 
not strong or forceful, and it did not explicitly instruct the jury to disregard the "totally 
and absolutely inappropriate" comments. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 271. 
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Third, in the event the jury understood that they were not required to consider 
counsel's statements, in this case it is plain they did not understand the admonition to 
relate to the prosecutor's misconduct. Instead, during deliberations, jurors asked whether 
they should give heed to what defense counsel said with respect to the shooting as the 
cause of death. (See R. 677:7-8.) The question confirmed that jurors were unduly 
persuaded by the prosecutor. ABA Stds Crim. Justice: Pros. Function and Def. Function, 
§ 3-5.8, commentary (jurors may give special weight to a prosecutor's arguments because 
of the prestige associated with and the fact-finding facilities available to the office). 
As set forth herein, the prosecutorial misconduct was not effectively, forcefully or 
promptly neutralized or corrected. The "curative" instruction was insufficient to over-
come the prejudice caused by the prosecutor's improper references and statements. 
See Troy, 688 P.2d at 487 (although the trial court attempted to correct the misconduct, 
the errors were too prejudicial). 
E. THE ISSUE WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
In this case, after the prosecutor made improper statements in closing argument, 
defense counsel asked for a recess so that the court could address objections outside the 
presence of the jury. When the jury was excused, counsel objected to the prosecutor's 
statements. Counsel explained that he generally did not like to object during closing argu-
ment since parties were given much leeway there. However, in this instance, counsel 
considered the prosecutor's statements to be beyond the permissible. (R. 676:30-32.) 
In response, the prosecutor argued that counsel's objections were untimely. (Id. at 
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33.) Thereafter, the judge specifically did not determine whether the objections were late; 
rather, the judge denied the motion for a mistrial and advised the parties that he would 
provide a "curative" instruction after the closing arguments.5 (R. 676:33.) 
In this case, the record supports timely objections for the following reasons. 
First, according to case law, an objection made after argument is sufficient to 
preserve the issue for appeal. See Cherry. 378 A.2d at 803 n.3 (objections to misconduct 
were timely, where the prosecutor made his closing arguments as the last order of 
5 Todd maintains that the objections here were timely. Nevertheless, if this Court 
considers them to be "untimely," this Court may review the issues here under the plain-
error doctrine and/or the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine. Under those 
doctrines, this Court will assess whether the prosecutor's misconduct constituted obvious 
error (plain error) or whether defense counsel's failure to "timely" object constituted defi-
cient performance (ineffective assistance), and whether Todd was prejudiced. See Casey, 
2003 UT 33, ^ }40 (for plain error, court considers whether the record supports obvious 
prejudicial error); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185-86 & n.5 (Utah 1990) (for ineffec-
tive assistance, court considers whether counsel's conduct was deficient and prejudicial). 
With respect to the first prong of plain error, this Court may find obvious error as 
set forth supra sub-points A. and B. (prosecutorial misconduct). For ineffective assis-
tance, if this Court reviews the record and finds the objections to be "untimely," it also 
may find deficient performance based on that same review of the record. See Pennsyl-
vania v. Adams, 492 A.2d 1, 2 n.l (Pa. Super. 1985) (ineffective assistance may be as-
serted by appeals counsel against trial counsel in the same public defenders office where 
error is plain on the record). Specifically, counsel objected to the prosecutor's miscon-
duct. That was appropriate. (R. 676:30-33.) If the objections were "untimely," that would 
be inappropriate/deficient on the record. The first prong of each doctrine is satisfied. 
The second prong considers prejudice. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n. 15 
(Utah 1989). Todd has shown prejudice here. (See supra, sub-points C. and D., herein.) 
Also, prejudice exists under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine based 
on the following: If this Court considers the objections to be "untimely," Todd faces the 
possibility that this Court will disregard the merits of the issues raised on appeal for 
procedural reasons. In that regard, Todd has suffered prejudicial harm; his rights on 
appeal will have been substantially affected. See. Casey, 2003 UT 33, |^40 (prejudice 
exists if it affects the substantial rights of a party). This Court may obviate the prejudice 
here by deciding the issues on the merits. 
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business on the second day of trial, and defense counsel objected at the beginning of the 
third day of trial; trial court had adequate opportunity to correct misconduct). 
Second, the purpose of the preservation doctrine is served by the objections in this 
case. Specifically, the objections were made in sufficient time for the judge to consider 
the matter and to provide a strong, prompt curative instruction to neutralize the effect of 
the damaging statements, or to declare a mistrial. Indeed, while the court had sufficient 
opportunity to correct the misconduct before the defense presented argument, the court 
chose not to do so. (See R. 676:33, 84); also Utah R. Crim. 20 (2003) (providing that 
once a party objects, that is sufficient for preservation; the party is not required to take 
further exception to the court's ruling to preserve the matter). That supports preservation. 
"The objective of the rules requiring a specific objection at trial is to bring issues to a 
trial court's attention and provide an opportunity to resolve them. In the present case, 
these objectives were met." SLC v. Holtman. 806 P.2d 235, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The record here was sufficient to put the court on notice of the prosecutorial misconduct. 
Third, while the court here decided the merits of the defendant's objections to the 
misconduct, the court specifically declined to provide an alternative basis for its ruling. 
Stated another way, the trial court declined to find that the objections were untimely. (R. 
676:33); State v. Topanotes. 2003 UT 30,1J9, 480 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (before an appellate 
court may affirm a matter on alternative grounds, the grounds must be "sustainable by the 
factual findings of the trial court"). 
In this case, the trial court's findings and ruling support that the objections were 
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timely. That is, the court proceeded to consider the merits of defendant's objections and 
the request for a mistrial. (R. 676:33.) On that basis, "the objection was preserved for 
appeal." State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991): see State v. Belgard. 830 
P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992); State v. Seale. 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993). 
Also, in connection with defendant's objection to the misconduct, the trial court 
here determined that it would provide a "curative" instruction. (R. 676:33.) In that 
regard, the trial court implicitly found that error occurred; also, the trial court believed the 
error could be cured. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 271; (R. 676: 33). That goes to the merits 
of the issue on appeal. While the trial court believed the error could be cured (R. 676:33), 
the "curative" instruction here was ineffective (see supra, sub-point D., herein). Also, the 
error was prejudicial. (See supra, sub-point C, herein.) 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court may review the merits of the issue on 
appeal. 
F. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE MERITS OF THE 
ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
1. The Sua Sponte Motion. 
On May 15, 2003, this Court filed a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition 
in this case, stating that it may dismiss the appeal for two reasons. (See Sua Sponte 
Motion for Summary Disposition, dated May 15, 2003, and attached hereto as 
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Addendum E ("Sua Sponte Motion").) First, the Court stated that Todd's motion for a 
new trial "was filed before the entry of judgment, sentence and commitment and did not 
operate to suspend the time for appeal." (Sua Sponte Motion.) 
Second, the Court maintained that "no signed judgment has been entered in the 
district court based upon the certified record transmitted to the court." (See id.) This 
Court specified that while Todd's Docketing Statement included a signed "judgement, 
sentence and commitment," dated March 28, 2001, the certified record on appeal did not. 
(See Sua Sponte Motion, n. 1.) 
After inviting the parties to respond to the Sua Sponte Motion, this Court supple-
mented the appellate record with a copy of the March 28 judgment. (See Order, dated 
June 23, 2003, and attached hereto as Addendum F.) This Court then withdrew the Sua 
Sponte Motion and ordered the parties to present argument in the briefs as to whether 
Todd's new trial motion and subsequent notice of appeal were timely filed so as to vest 
this Court with jurisdiction in the matter. (See, Order, dated August 22, 2003, attached as 
Addendum G.) Todd maintains that the filings were timely, as further explained below. 
2. A Timely Motion Under Rule 24(c) Tolls the Time for Filing the Notice of 
Appeal. To Be Timely, a Rule 24(c) Motion Must Be Filed Within 10 Days of the 
"Imposition of Sentence." 
Rule 4(b), Utah R. App. P., provides that if a party files a timely motion for a new 
trial under Rule 24 of the criminal rules, "the time for appeal for all parties shall run from 
the entry of the order denying" the new trial motion. Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (2003). 
Rule 24(c) specifies that a new trial motion will be timely if it is filed "within 10 
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days after imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during 
the ten-day period." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c) (2003). 
In this case the trial judge imposed sentence against Todd in open court on March 
14, 2001. (R. 678.) Thereafter, on March 28, 2001, the judge executed the judgment. 
(See R. 685-86.) On March 22, 2001, Todd filed a new trial motion. (R. 516-18.) The 
motion was filed within 10 days after imposition of the sentence. (R. 678.) 
While the trial court executed the judgment of conviction several days after 
imposing the sentence, in the context of this case, that is irrelevant. In accordance with 
the plain language of rule 24(c), the clock began to run for Todd to file the new trial 
motion on March 14, the date the trial court imposed sentencing. Todd filed his motion 
on March 22. (R. 516-18.) That tolled the time for filing the notice of appeal. Utah R. 
App. P. 4(b). Todd then filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 632) after the trial court 
denied the new trial motion. (R. 592-94.) The plain language of Rule 24(c) supports that 
Todd timely filed the motion and subsequent notice of appeal in this case. 
(a) Rule 24(c) must be construed in accordance with its plain language and to 
avoid confusion. 
Where Rule 24 contemplates that "imposition of sentence" shall trigger the filing 
of the new trial motion, that provision must be construed in accordance with its plain 
language. See Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ^ [17, 5 P.3d 616. This Court will presume 
the drafters of the rule used the words in the provision advisedly. State v. Ewell ,883 P.2d 
1360, 1363 (Utah App. 1993). Also, this Court will interpret Rule 24(c) to ensure that it 
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is not unreasonably confusing. Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 934 (Utah App. 1998). 
In construing Rule 24(c), this Court will consider the intent of the drafters. In that 
regard, the Court will look to other provisions and it will compare the language of Rule 
24(c) to those provisions. Accordingly, this Court may begin with Rule 4(b), Utah R. 
App. P., and the provisions identified in that rule for tolling the time for an appeal. 
Pursuant to Rule 4(b), if a party files a timely motion under Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 
59, Utah R. Civ. P., the time for filing an appeal is tolled until after the entry of an order 
denying or granting that motion. Utah R. App. P. 4(b). A motion under those rules must 
be filed not later than 10 days "after [] entry of judgment". Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b), 52(b) 
and 59 (2003). Comparing Rule 24(c) to the other provisions that toll the time for filing 
an appeal demonstrates that the drafters used the language in Rule 24(c) advisedly. If 
they had intended execution of judgment to trigger the filing of a new trial motion in 
criminal cases, they would have specified that as the relevant act in the rule. Since the 
drafters did not use that language in Rule 24(c), this Court may find that "imposition of 
sentence" and "entry of judgment" are not the same thing; they are distinct, separate acts.6 
That interpretation is supported in other respects. Specifically, consider Rule 
6 In this case, "imposition of sentence," and "entry of judgment" occurred at different 
times. (See R. 678 (imposition of sentence on March 14); 685-86 (execution of 
judgment on March 28).) 
In State v. Putnik. 2002 UT 122, 63 P.3d 91; State v. Gardner. 2001 UT 41, 23 
P.3d 1043; and State v. Vessev, 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the trial 
court imposed sentence and entered a judgment of conviction on the same day. Putnik. 
2002 UT 122, HI; Gardner, 2001 UT 41,1J3; Vessey, 957 P.2d at 1240 (pro se defendant 
filed a new trial motion before sentencing, and a motion 5 months after sentencing). 
Thus, the clock for filing a new trial motion began to run on that day. 
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22(c), Utah R. Crim. P. It provides that after a jury finds a defendant guilty or after a 
defendant enters a guilty plea, "the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a 
judgment of conviction." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c) (2003) (emphasis added). The rule 
uses the term "and" to indicate that the events are separate. See. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
3-402(1) (1999) (the court may "enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree 
of offense and impose sentence accordingly"); 77-2a-4 (1999) (upon violation of a plea 
in abeyance, the court may "enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against 
the defendant"). 
Next, case law supports the determination that "imposition of sentence" and entry 
of judgment are distinct acts. Specifically, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
recently considered specific rights afforded to a defendant in connection with sentencing. 
Both courts recognized that defendant has the right to be present in open court and to 
present mitigating information relevant to the imposition of the sentence. See State v. 
Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, fflflO, 29, 34, 31 P.3d 615, aff d . 2003 UT 34, 482 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 14. Thus, imposition of sentence implicates important constitutional rights, 
including the presence of the defendant. Todd is not aware of any case that affords the 
defendant the same rights and protections simply when a judgment is executed. Thus, 
imposition of sentence and execution of judgment can occur at different times, as they 
did in this case. (See R. 678:18-19 (on March 14, imposing sentence to issue 
"forthwith"); 685-86 (on March 28, executing the judgment).) 
Other courts have distinguished between imposition of a sentence and entry of 
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judgment. A sentence is imposed when it is first announced on the record by the judge in 
open court in the presence of the defendant. See. Rodarte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 781, 782 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (distinguishing between the imposition of a sentence and the 
entry of judgment for purposes of filing a notice of appeal), aff d, 860 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1993); State v. Trunneh 549 P.2d 550, 551 (Alaska 1976) (stating that a 
"sentence is imposed' at the time it is first announced upon the record by the court11); 
Kriebelv. U.S., 10 F.2d 762, 764 (7 th Cir. 1926) (defining "imposition" of sentence). 
Entry of judgment consists of execution of a formal written document. 
Common sense and practice further support the distinctions. The imposition of 
sentence occurred when the trial court pronounced consecutive prison terms against 
Todd in open court (see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (1999)), while the entry of judg-
ment reflected the final disposition in writing. Indeed, as is common, the written judg-
ment here identified Todd's guilty plea to count II on November 16, 2000 (see_ R. 685; 
see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (guilty pleas)), the verdict for count I on January 23, 2001 
(see R. 685; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 21 (2003) (verdicts)), and the sentence. (R. 685.) 
Just as a "guilty plea" and "verdict" occurred separate from the entry of judgment 
(see Utah R. Crim P. 11 and 21 (2003)), so did the imposition of the sentence. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (sentencing); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and (c). 
(b) Even if this Court were to find that "imposition of sentence" occurred in this 
case after Todd filed the new trial motion, this Court may nevertheless affirm its 
jurisdiction over the matter, and decide the appeal on the merits. 
In this case, the record supports that Todd followed the plain language of Rule 
47 
24(c). He filed the new trial motion after imposition of sentence in open court. 
In the event this Court interprets Rule 24(c) to apply after execution of judgment 
(thereby making the appeal here untimely), Todd will have been denied his right to 
appeal through no fault of his own. Indeed, he endeavored to comply with the plain 
language of the rule in good faith. Thus, if this Court were to construe Rule 24(c) to 
apply after entry of judgment, this Court also should find that under the unique circum-
stances of this case, Todd's filing was reasonable: it was within ten days of sentencing. 
To that end, this Court may issue any "process necessary" "in aid of its 
jurisdiction" over the appeal in this matter. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(b) (2002); 
Boggess v. Morris. 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981) (providing that the supreme court had the 
authority to call up the record for review of the issues even though the time for appeal in 
the case had lapsed); also Barnard v. Murphy. 882 P.2d 679, 681 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(recognizing that the authority to issue a writ "in aid" of appellate jurisdiction is not 
confined to cases where jurisdiction is already acquired, but extends also to those cases 
within the court's reach, where an appeal has not been perfected). This Court may 
recognize that the official record of this case is before the Court, and the case is within 
the Court's reach. Thus, this Court may issue a "writ" or an order in aid of its 
jurisdiction so that it may decide the appeal on the merits. 
In this matter, the judge imposed sentence on March 14, and executed the judg-
ment on March 28. (R. 678; 685-86.) Todd filed his new trial motion after imposition of 
the sentence. According to Utah R. App. P. 4(b) and the plain language of Utah R. Crim. 
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P. 24(c), the new trial motion effectively tolled the time for filing the notice of appeal. 
Todd requests that this Court decide the case on the merits, where the new trial motion 
and the notice of appeal were filed in accordance with the rules. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Todd respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the conviction and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this 5^day of VU^t^O^ 2003. 
fA4d^t^JQr^ 
LINDA M. JONES 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
HAR-29-01 THU 03:14 PM FAX NO. P. 02 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
aTA'J'R OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
SHAYNG E TODD, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case NO: 991906743 FS 
Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
Date: March 14, 2001 
L'iJliJSKNT 
Clerk.: wendypg 
Reporter: AMBROSE, EILEEN 
Prouociltor: NOLAN, DANE C 
Descendant 
Defendant'a Attorney(s); FINLAYSON, DAVID V 
DEPENDANT INFORMATION 
DjV.fi of birth: April 30, 1971 
Vi deo 
CHAKCJKS 
1. MURDF,R - 1st Degree Felony 
Pica: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/23/2001 Guilty 
2. PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 2nd Degree Felony 
Pica: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/16/2000 Guilty 
11 BAR TNG 
Th* above e n t i t l e d case comea before the court for sentenc ing . 
Defendant, transported from the pr i son . 
Counaol addresses the court request ing the p s y c h o l o g i c a l records 
bo nK-ido a part of the pre-sentence report . Court so orders . 
Court: orders DA t o preserve a l l evidence pending an appeal . 
pflr iA i 
HAR-29-Q1 THU 0 3 : 1 5 Ptl FAX NO. 
r, uo 
CAHQ N O ; 991906743 
Date: Mar 14, 2001 
SlttvfTENCE PRISON 
Waned on the defendant's conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than fivo years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
TlQMid on the defendant's conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON 
a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the 
Utah Slate Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To tho SALT LAKL; County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
dt'ifcvndanl: will be confined. 
f.lriNTRNCK PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court order© count 1 and count 2 to run consecutive. Also this 
c:\st) is to run consecutive with any others defendant is serving 
lime on. 
Pacrr> 0 ( l a n f l 
ADDENDUM B 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
ADDENDUM C 
DAVID E.YOCOM ' W I w ^ l ' 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County I 
C.DANE NOLAN 4891 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAYNE E. TODD, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 991906743 FS 
JUDGE DENNIS M. FUCHS 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court on the 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial, the State being represented by its counsel, C. Dane 
Nolan, Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office, the defendant being present in person 
and being represented by his counsel, David V. Finlayson, and the Court having heard 
testimony and considered the parties' arguments - the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Order Denying Motion for New Trial are hereby entered. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. During jury deliberations in this case the jury submitted a question to the 
Court. The question was: 
The defense in their closing indicated that the only act we were to 
consider was the shooting of the gun. (Which was the actual action which 
led to Stephanie's death.) Mr. Finlayson said we were not to consider the 
drive through the parking lot with Stephanie hanging onto the Blazer as 
part of the act that led to her death; is this correct? 
2. Neither the State's lawyers nor the defendant's lawyers were at the courthouse 
at that time. The lawyers had provided phone numbers to the Court. 
3. The Court responded to the jury's question verbally; stating that "you can - the 
fact that she was hanging onto the Blazer was the factual testimony that was factual - but 
that in regards to their question, they had to look to the jury instructions for any answers." 
Verdict Transcript, page 8. 
4. The jury's question did not ask for a clarification of a jury instruction. The 
jury instructions previously given were clear. 
5. After being informed that the jury had reached a verdict, but before the verdict 
was read, the Court, in its chambers and off the record, informed Mr. Finlayson and Miss 
Hunt of the jury's question and the Court's response. No objection was lodged by either 
party. 
6. After the guilty verdict was read and the jury was dismissed, the Court made a 
record of the jury's question and the Court's response in the presence of counsel and the 
defendant. No objection was lodged by either party. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
7. The defendant suffered no prejudice because of the Court's failure to contact 
the parties prior to responding to the jury's question. The Court's response simply 
referred the jury to the jury instructions for guidance. 
8. The defendant received a fair trial. The evidence against him was 
overwhelming and the jury's verdict was well supported by the facts. 
9. The Court has reviewed the transcript of the closing arguments and has 
determined that no misstatements of the law or fact were made by the State. No 
prosecutorial misconduct was committed. Additionally, the jury was adequately 
instructed that attorney's statements was not testimony or facts. 
10. Any other findings or conclusions made by the court as reflected on the 
record are incorporated herein. 
ORDER 
11. For the reasons discussed above the defendant's Motion for a New Trial is 
hereby denied. 
J/9AS Zoo J 
Dated this p 3 day of December, 2002". 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing was delivered to David V. 
Finlayson, Attorney for Defendant, 142 East 200 South, Suite, 312, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84111, on the day of January, 2003, through the United States Postal Service. 
ADDENDUM D 
0 3-Y 1 U1*X31WA^ 9 flUJFDDISTHffiTCgtfBT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRrOSrdGtttftetel District 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAff &)$ U^Ofll 
,jSALT LAKE COUN" 
THE STATE 
SHAYNE E. 
OF UTAH, ) 
VS 
TODD 
Plaintiff, ) 
r ) 
Defendant. ) 
Dy^J.A.flU'*"7'7 
J TY.-? / 
Deputy Clerk 
CASE NO. 991906743 
Closing Argument 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DENNIS M. FUCHS 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-1860 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
JANUARY 22, 2001 FILED 
Clark of tfts Court 
REPORTED BY: Jody Edwards, CSR, RPR, RMR, CRR 
238-7378 
U~ll~ 
1 didn't stop to see if his wife was all right, he fled. 
2 In law school our professors like to teach us little 
3 Latin phrases and one of them that I remember, which is 
4 probably about the only one I remember, is res ipsa loquitur, 
5 which means the thing speaks for itself. This evidence speaks 
6 for itself. There's a lot more evidence to consider and I'll 
7 be talking about it today too, but this evidence, by itself, 
8 the undisputed evidence in this case proves that the defendant 
9 intentionally placed the gun against Stephanie's head and 
10 pulled the trigger. And on this evidence alone you can find 
11 the defendant guilty. 
12 Now let's go back to the elements. The first theory 
13 of murder, that the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused 
14 the death of another. Remember that intentionally caused the 
15 death does not mean premeditated. You do not have to find that 
16 the defendant intended to harm Stephanie in any way at the time 
17 that he went to that meeting. You don't have to find that he 
18 intended to harm Stephanie when he loaded the magazine into the 
19 gun. And you don't have to find that he intended to harm 
20 Stephanie at the time that he racked the bullet into the 
21 chamber. What you have to find is that at the time that he 
22 pulled the trigger he intended or knew that Stephanie would die 
23 as a result of his conduct. 
24 Under B, Intends to cause serious bodily injury, 
25 again, the defendant himself told you he wanted Stephanie off 
1 of the vehicle. She jumped on the vehicle. He admitted he 
2 drove through the parking lot. He admitted that he didn't slow 
3 down for her to jump off. He admitted that he thought there 
4 was no reason why she couldn't just let go. 
5 Twenty miles per hour, 30 miles per hour, not quick 
6 speeds on the freeway, but in a parking lot when you're hanging 
7 onto the side of a lifted-up vehicle, extremely fast speeds, 
8 extremely dangerous conduct. Trying to push someone off a 
9 moving car in a parking lot is an act that is intended to cause 
10 serious bodily injury. And if you add to that a gun, even if 
11 the defendant were merely pushing her with the gun, certainly 
12 you can find that the defendant intended to cause Stephanie 
13 serious bodily injury and that in doing that he caused her 
14 death. 
15 And finally, probably the least mental state of the 
16 three for homicide, you can find murder without finding that 
17 the defendant intended to cause serious bodily injury or that 
18 he intended to cause her death, by finding that the defendant 
19 evidenced a depraved indifference to human life. And those 
20 terms are defined in your instructions. And I want to talk 
21 about that a little bit. 
22 In instruction number 17, depraved indifference is 
23 defined as an utter callousness toward the value of human life, 
24 unmitigated wickedness, extreme inhumanity, and acts exhibiting 
25 a high degree of wantonness and a complete and total 
1 indifference as to whether onef s conduct will create a grave 
2 risk of death to another. I want you to think about when 
3 Mr. Tueller was here talking to you about the Glock gun. Do 
4 you remember how much care we all took with the gun. There was 
5 a discussion that the gun would not be pointed at any person. 
6 The bailiff and Mr. Tueller looked at the gun carefully, 
7 examined it to make sure that it wasn't loaded. We all knew 
8 the gun wasn't loaded. We knew that there were no bullets in 
9 that gun. And yet still not one person would have ever pointed 
10 that gun toward another person. And I suspect that when you 
11 have the gun and you're examining it in the jury room, you 
12 won't point that gun at each other either, because that's 
13 reckless to point even an unloaded gun at another person. 
14 But to point a gun that you know is loaded and that 
15 you know has a bullet in the firing chamber, that you know will 
16 fire with a mere pull of the trigger, to point a gun like that 
17 at another person is depraved indifference to human life. And 
18 to take a gun and not only point it at another person but to 
19 push it up against another person's head when you know the gun 
20 is ready to fire, that is depraved indifference to human life. 
21 No one would ever do such a thing unless they really didn't 
22 care about the result. 
23 And you would have to find that the defendant engaged 
24 in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another. Of 
25 course pushing a loaded firearm into someone's head would 
1 create a grave risk of death. But I submit to you if the 
2 defendant didn't have a gun in this situation, if all you had 
3 were the defendant driving across the parking lot with a young 
4 woman hanging on the outside of his car and him pushing her off 
5 of the car, if that had been the situation and he had pushed 
6 her off the Blazer and she had been pulled under the wheels and 
7 killed, you would still have murder. But in this situation the 
8 defendant added a firearm. 
9 Now, after you consider the elements of murder your 
10 instructions also require you to then go to, I believe it's 
11 instruction number 12, to consider whether the defendant's 
12 acting under extreme emotional disturbance. It's not 
13 number 12. It's encompassed in number 12. Number 12 is the 
14 manslaughter instruction. 
15 Let me move this back. So excuse me for just a 
16 moment. 
17 To find the defendant guilty of murder you also have 
18 to find that he was not acting under an extreme emotional 
19 disturbance. An extreme emotional disturbance is also defined 
20 in your instructions. So one thing about extreme emotional 
21 disturbance that you need to consider, and it's in your 
22 instructions, is that it can't be something that has been 
23 brought on by the defendant himself. In this case it's the 
24 State's position that there isn't a shred of evidence that the 
25 defendant was acting under an extreme emotional disturbance. 
1 that Stephanie might be armed. And she certainly wasn't. It's 
2 the defendant who brought the gun. It's the defendant who 
3 loaded the gun. It's the defendant who racked the bullet into 
4 the chamber. And it's the defendant who decided to drive away 
5 after Stephanie grabbed onto the Blazer. It's the defendant 
6 who didn't stop as he started driving and realized that she 
7 wasn't going to let go. Any disturbance, any emotional stress 
8 the defendant was under that night was caused by his own doing. 
9 Now, the defendant spent a considerable amount of 
10 time with Lieutenant Nosack and Detective Soper. I think four 
11 to five hours was the testimony. An interview with them 
12 telling them his version or in this case many several different 
13 versions of what happened that night. And he also had the 
14 opportunity to come up on the stand and to testify and to tell 
15 you his version of what happened that night. But Stephanie 
16 didn't get to do that. And I can tell you that Stephanie 
17 surely would have liked to have sat down with the investigators 
18 and spent four or five hours telling them her version of what 
19 happened that night. And Stephanie would have liked to have 
20 come into this courtroom and told you what happened that night. 
21 And as you go through and you consider the evidence 
22 that you heard, you'll find that it's pretty clear what 
23 Stephanie would have told you if she had been here. Stephanie 
24 would have told you that in September of 1998 she and the 
25 defendant separated. And that she was trying hard as a single 
1 mom with three kids to make ends meet, to pay the bills. And 
2 she was struggling but she was doing it. 
3 And she would tell you that in February of 1998 she 
4 finally was able to get the defendant to agree to give her the 
5 title to a Blazer that she had been driving since September. 
6 And that when she got the title she was able to go out and go 
7 to the bank and get a loan on the Blazer, a loan for $1,300. 
8 Money that she told her mother she was very excited about 
9 having. She was going to be able to pay off some of her bills, 
10 start fresh, start new. 
11 And Stephanie would tell you about her frustration 
12 that day, February 28th, when she came out of the house in the 
13 afternoon to find that the Blazer was gone. She probably would 
14 tell you that she immediately knew who took it. That she 
15 called the police and tried to get the police to help her 
16 retrieve the Blazer. But the police weren't able to help her 
17 because it was a civil problem. It was still marital property 
18 and the defendant legally was not guilty of theft for taking 
19 the Blazer. 
20 And she would tell you how frustrated she was to not 
21 only have lost the Blazer, but to have lost her purse with the 
22 $1,300 cash. And here she was, no car, no money, and a $1,300 
23 loan. Stephanie would probably tell you that when she talked 
24 to the defendant and he agreed to meet her and he told her he 
25 would give her back the Blazer, he told her he would return her 
1 purse with the money, she would tell you she was relieved. She 
2 was so glad that the defendant has going to meet her. But she 
3 was worried there might be problems, so she asked two of her 
4 friends to come and be at the parking lot just in case. She 
5 asked John Dinga and Troy Roberts to come. And, in fact, the 
6 plan was that she was going to go with her brother, who the 
7 defendant knew and trusted, to Hometown Buffet. The two 
8 friends would wait across the street in the other parking lot. 
9 Stephanie would tell you that it wasn't her design to 
10 have them pull Shayne out of the vehicle and take the§vehicle. 
11 She just wanted them there in case there were problems so that 
12 they could help her. She didnf t plan for them to be two cars 
13 away. She didn't plan for the exchange to take place in the 
14 Wal-Mart parking lot. 
15 And she would tell you that when the defendant pulled 
16 up and handed her brother Kelly an empty purse and wasn't ready 
17 to turn over the Blazer, that she got mad and she got out of 
18 the car and she went over to the defendant's window to let him 
19 know how mad she was. And you can understand how angry she 
20 must have been. 
21 And she would tell you that when it became clear that 
22 the defendant was about to drive away, she wanted to stop him. 
23 He had her money, her $1,300. How was show going to pay that 
24 back? And he had the Blazer, the only car that she had. And 
25 so she grabbed onto the Blazer to try to stop him. 
1 And if Stephanie were here she would probably tell ' 
2 you that she regretted her decision to grab onto the Blazer as 
3 soon as she did it, because the defendant didn't stop, he kept 
4 going. And I think Stephanie would tell you that it was a 
5 pretty frightening ride. That the parking lot was bumpy, the 
6 suspension was high, when she put her feet down they rubbed on 
7 the pavement, you can see that from the scuffing on the 
8 sandals. And Stephanie would tell you that she held onto that 
9 vehicle with everything that she could, because she was afraid 
10 that if she let go she would have been dragged under the wheels 
11 and crushed by the car. Stephanie would tell you that she felt 
12 like if she let go of that Blazer she would be killed. 
13 Stephanie would tell you that she didn't reach into 
14 the vehicle to grab the gun because she couldn't see into the 
15 defendant's lap. And she couldn't see on the seat between the 
16 defendant's legs. She might tell you that the defendant told 
17 you the truth when he was the one who said, Stephanie, I have a 
18 gun. She would tell you that the defendant kept telling her to 
19 let go. She would tell you that she screamed at the defendant 
20 and begged him to stop the car. I think Stephanie would tell 
21 you that she looked back hoping somebody was coming to help 
22 her. And that as she had her head turned away looking behind 
23 her, maybe she could see her brother, that she could feel the 
24 barrel of the gun pressed up against her head. But there 
25 wasn't anything she could do. And she'd probably tell you that 
1 she hoped the defendant wouldn't pull the trigger. She may 
2 even tell you that she tried to push the gun away but there was 
3 little she could do because it was too hard to let go of the 
4 truck. And she had a decision to make and she decided to keep 
5 holding on with everything that she had. 
6 Now, Duane Moyes told you that he is confident that 
7 there was a ricochet. There was scratches on the bullet 
8 consistent with hitting pavement. There was scratches on it 
9 when it hit the glass. I want you to think about that. If 
10 that's true, there's good evidence that that is true, this is 
11 Stephanie's head, was turned like this, facing behind the 
12 Blazer. This is the angle that the bullet went through her 
13 held. If there was a ricochet her head was like this when the 
14 bullet was fired. 
15 I think Stephanie would tell you that the defendant 
16 was pushing against her head with the gun. That she was trying 
17 to get her head away from the gun. And Stephanie would tell 
18 you that she didn't even see the defendant pull the trigger. 
19 That all she felt was an explosion in her head as she fell to 
20 the ground. And if Stephanie were here, she would have come up 
21 and sat in that witness chair and she would have pointed at the 
22 defendant and she would have said, that man seated right there 
23 in between his two attorneys murdered me on February 28, 1999. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Hunt. 
25 Are the jurors okay? 
1 MR. FINLAYSON: Judge, can we take a five-minute 
2 recess? 
3 THE COURT: Sure. Okay. We're going to take a 
4 recess. That will let you use the bathroom before we listen to 
5 the defendant's rebuttal. Again, you cannot discuss the case 
6 yet with each other. You haven't heard all the closing, all 
7 right? Thank you. 
8 (The following proceedings were held in open court 
9 out of the presence of the jury.) 
10 THE COURT: Be seated, please. Let the record 
11 reflect that the jury is not present. 
12 MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, I don't like to object 
13 during counsel's closing arguments and I usually try not to 
14 object to each other's closing arguments since we're allowed 
15 quite a bit of flexibility in closing arguments, but there are 
16 somethings that are absolutely legally wrong about what 
17 Ms. Hunt said. And that is that depraved indifference, murder, 
18 cannot ever be simply somebody pointing a loaded gun at 
19 somebody's head. There's case law that discusses depraved 
20 indifference, murder, it has to be somebody shooting into a 
21 crowd, somebody — I mean, the examples that are given in the 
22 case law, like Bolinger and those cases, are a child who is 
23 beaten over several weeks to the point of death, a shooting 
24 into a crowd, a guy who sits there and shoots a gun at his 
25 girlfriend while she's sitting on the ground inches away from 
1 her and one of them bounces into her head. Those are depraved 
2 indifference. That can — it could never be depraved 
3 indifference for somebody simply to point a loaded gun at 
4 somebodyf s head because you have no idea that thatfs going to 
5 go off. 
6 I'm not even — I don't even think that that would 
7 rise to the level of recklessness. 
8 Also, on the second prong of homicide, the act that 
9 the person commits with the intention for serious bodily 
10 injury, that act can't be driving through the parking lot. In 
11 that case that act has to be the act that causes her death. 
12 And those — that's an improper way to argue those. And I 
13 objected and we made our directed verdict motion clear at the 
14 time that that was what I thought that they were going to 
15 argue, that that wasn't depraved indifference or an act clearly 
16 dangerous to human life. And that's exactly what they did, was 
17 they came in and argued what — and what's clear about the 
18 cases that talk about those is that it's akin to intentional 
19 knowing murder. And there's numerous cases that talk about 
20 what the level of evidence is required to show depraved 
21 indifference and an act clearly dangerous to human life. 
22 Based on Ms. Hunt's closing argument, your Honor, I 
23 would ask that you withdraw those two portions -- those two I 
24 guess alternative theories for murder, because neither one of 
25 those theories under the way she argued them can possibly apply 
1 in this case. It simply cannot be driving through the parking 
2 lot creates an act clearly dangerous to human life and she was 
3 killed by a gun so itfs murder. Or holding a loaded gun up to 
4 her head or pushing a loaded gun to her head or whatever it was 
5 that she argued is depraved indifference. It simply cannot be 
6 and we would ask that those be withdrawn, otherwise a mistrial 
7 would be granted at this point. That's simply not proper to 
8 argue it that way in closing argument. 
9 And I don't — you know, I don't have a problem with 
10 Ms. Hunt referencing Stephanie Todd, but to tell the story from 
11 Stephanie Todd's perspective who absolutely couldn't be here, 
12 obviously, and to put in facts in evidence that -- put in facts 
13 in her closing argument that weren't brought into evidence 
14 because, we didn't have any statements from Stephanie, is 
15 improper. And I think — I think — I don't — your Honor, I 
16 don't know, I mean, everybody has their own idea of how they 
17 want to present their closing argument but that's simply 
18 inflammatory. And, you know, they're allowed to bring in a 
19 photograph of Stephanie and they're allowed to present evidence 
20 that she was — that — this is a case about her too, that she 
21 was killed in this case, but that's over inflammatory. And 
22 that's what I wanted to put on the record. We'd ask that a 
23 mistrial be granted, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Okay, any response from the State? 
25 MS. HUNT: Judge, just that it's argument. It's not 
1 a case where the victim was killed because the car was just 
2 driving down the street and she fell off. I mean, there was a 
3 gun involved in this case. There was more to it and the jury 
4 has been properly instructed. They will decide the case 
5 properly If m confident. 
6 As far as using the perspective of Stephanie, I think 
7 that it's proper argument to draw any reasonable inferences 
8 from the evidence. And I think the evidence is clear that from 
9 Stephanie's perspective that's what happened. 
10 And the objection is a bit late. If Mr. Finlayson 
11 didn't think that was proper, he could have objected early into 
12 it. And yet he waited until the entire argument was over, 
13 so — but I think it's proper argument and we would stand by 
14 the closing. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Your objections are noted. I'm 
16 not sure whether they're timely on the not, Mr. Finlayson. But 
17 they are on the record. The Court is going to deny your motion 
18 for a mistrial. The Court will instruct the injury after your 
19 closing and rebuttal to again deliberate only biased on the 
20 evidence that they've heard and has been admitted. And they 
21 are not to be guided simply by passion or prejudice or 
22 arguments. That the attorneys are arguing, not testifying. So 
23 if you would remind me I'll make sure that I reemphasize that 
24 to the jury. But other than that you've made your record and 
25 your motion is denied. 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Shayne E. Todd, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
NLLD 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAY 15 2003 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
SUA SPONTE MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case NO.20030157-CA 
TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND/OR THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
A docketing statement has been filed with the Court of 
Appeals in the above-captioned case. This appeal is being 
considered for summary dismissal under rule 10 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure on grounds that the motion for new trial 
was filed before the entry of judgment, sentence and commitment 
and did not operate to suspend the time for appeal, State v. 
Vessey, 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah 1998), or in the alternative, 
no signed judgment has been entered in the district court based 
upon the certified record transmitted to the court.1 See Utah R. 
App. P. 10(a). 
In lieu of a brief, both parties shall file a memorandum, 
not to exceed ten pages, explaining why summary disposition 
should, or should not, be granted by the court. Failure to file 
a memorandum may result in granting of the motion. 
An original and four copies of the memorandum should be 
filed with the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before 
May 28, 2003. 
DATED this _T5 day of May, 2003. 
xn c±>t~MU. 
udith M. Billings, Judge 
^cA^ 
1. Appellant's docketing statement attaches a judgment, sentence 
and commitment signed on March 28, 2001; however, that document 
does not appear in the certified record. Appellantfs motion for 
new trial was filed on March 22, 2001. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on May 15, 2003, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing SUA SPONTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION was 
deposited in the United States mail to the parties listed below: 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
LINDA M. JONES 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this May 15, 2003. 
viC/laAVur 
DepjSy Clerk 
Catee No. 20030157/ 
C^YK 
ADDENDUM F 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Shayne E. Todd, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
! Jteh Court of Appeals 
JUN 2 3 2003 
f-^ uSette Stagg 
Cierk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 20030157-CA 
This matter is before the court upon Appellant's motion, 
filed May 28, 2003, to include a copy of the "Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment" signed on March 28, 2001. The Appellee did not 
object or otherwise respond to the motion. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the record on appeal shall be 
supplemented with the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" signed by 
the trial court judge on March 28, 2001, as part of the certified 
record on appeal. The appeals clerk shall prepare the 
supplemental index and forward the supplemental index and the 
supplemental record to this court. 
Dated this ^ ^^aay of June, 2003. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Nofman H. Jack; 
Presiding Jud 
ADDENDUM G 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
riLCU 
U*h Court of Appeals 
AUG 2 2 2003 
Pautette Stagg 
Cleric of the Court 
Sta te of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Shayne E. Todd 
Defendant and Appellant 
ORDER 
Case No. 20030157-CA 
This case is before the court on a sua sponte motion for 
summary dismissal. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sua sponte motion for summary 
dismissal is withdrawn, and a ruling on the issues raised therein 
is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the 
appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 10(f). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall brief the issue 
of whether entry of sentence is required for imposition of 
sentence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22, 24. 
The parties will be notified when a briefing schedule has 
been established. 
^7 0 DATED this ^ SU day of August, 2003. 
FOR THE COURT 
William A. Thorne Jr., *J(idge~ 
